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The Stockmarket, the Financing of Corporate Growth and Indian Industrial 
Development 
 
 
by Ajit Singh
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
 
In the General Theory, Keynes was stringent in his criticism of the role of the stockmarket in 
relation to industrial investment and the real economy. In a famous passage, in chapter 12 he 
wrote:"As the organisation of investment markets improves, the risk of the predominance of 
speculation does, however, increase. In one of the greatest investment markets in the world, 
namely, New York, the influence of speculation (in the above sense, ie. 'the activity of 
forecasting the psychology of the market')is enormous. ... Speculators may do no harm as 
bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes 
the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a 
by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." 
 
That was yesterday. Today the stockmarkets are the 'toast of the town' - new ones are being 
established and existing ones being expanded around the globe, from Kingston, Jamaica to Ulan 
Bator in Outer Mongolia. The fast expansion of the Indian stockmarkets during the last decade 
or so, and particularly under the present government's programme of economic reform over the 
last two years, is therefore a part of a world-wide phenomenon. 
 
 In terms of the number of companies listed on the stockmarket, the Indian stockmarket today is 
the second largest in the world, only slightly behind the United States. In 1992, there were 6,700 
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 2 
companies quoted on the Indian stockmarkets, compared with 7,014 in the US, 1,874 in the UK, 
665 in Germany, 668 in Korea, 585 in Brazil and 185 in Mexico. The average daily trading 
volume on the Bombay stockmarket is about the same as that in London - about 45,000 trades a 
day. At the peak of stockmarket activity, trading occurred at double that rate. Any large Indian 
city worth its name can now boast of a stock exchange. There are functioning stock exchanges 
in twenty two cities, the latest one being Coimbatore.  
 
Although this evident Indian fascination with the stockmarket is a part of a world wide trend, it 
deserves critical examination. This is not just because of Keynes's scepticism, but more 
significantly  because the role of the stockmarkets is being seriously questioned today in the 
very citadels of these markets, namely the US and the UK. There currently rages an important  
debate in these countries about the efficacy of stock markets for long term industrial investment 
and international competitiveness. It is being increasingly argued by industrialists and business 
leaders,as well as by academic economists, that the operations of the stockmarket are leading to 
the phenomenon of "short-termism" (through speculation, leveraged hostile takeovers, etc). The 
stockmarket is thereby thought to be  harming these economies and putting them at a 
competitive disadvantage with respect to countries like Japan and Germany where  such 
markets play a much less prominent role in relation to industrial activity. Thus Professor 
Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School, reporting recently on the results of a large 
research project on various aspects of the US financial system: "..the change in nature of 
competition and the increasing pressure of globalization make investment the most critical 
determinant of competitive advantage. ... Yet the US system of allocating investment capital 
both within and across companies is failing. This puts American companies at a serious 
disadvantage in global competition and ultimately threatens the long term growth of the US 
economy."
2
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In this overall intellectual context the present paper concentrates on exploring some aspects of 
the relationship between the stockmarket and Indian industrial development. Sections II-IV 
present analysis of Indian corporate finance in a comparative international context. Specifically 
these sections explore the role of the equity market in financing the growth of the hundred 
largest Indian manufacturing corporations. Section V considers various indicators of 
stockmarket development in India and other newly industrialising Asian economies. Section VI 
examines the implications of these developments for long term economic growth and 
industrialisation of the country in the light of theoretical analysis and empirical evidence from 
countries where the stockmarkets play a leading role. Section VII concludes and briefly 
considers policy issues. 
 
II.  Corporate Financial Structures and the Financing Patterns in India, 1980 - 1990 
II.1 The Large Indian and Third World Firms 
 
How do large Indian corporations finance their growth? Do they rely more on internal or 
external sources of finance? How do the corporate capital structures and financing patterns in 
India compare with those in other industrialising economies or in advanced countries? How has 
the fast growth of the Indian stock markets during the last decade affected corporate financing 
patterns? 
 
Relatively little work has been done on such questions not only for the Indian corporate 
economy, but for industrialising countries in general. This in part reflects the fact that 
development economists have not paid sufficient attention to the critical role of large third firms 
in late industrialisation
3
. Yet even casual observation cannot fail to indicate that in the newly 
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industrialising countries such firms spearhead technological development, adapt foreign 
technology to local requirements and play a major role in third world's manufactured exports. 
 
Moreover, large third world firms share certain important common characteristics which 
distinguish them from advanced country corporations both today as well as in the past (when 
advanced countries were undergoing their own industrial revolutions). It is a remarkable fact 
that like the Tatas and the Birlas in India, large privately owned third world firms in a wide 
range of industrialising economies tend to be organised in the form of 'groups' which are 
diversified in a large variety of unrelated activities. Amsden and Hikino (1994) and Singh 
(1994, 1995) suggest that these seemingly irrational third world conglomerates differ in very 
significant ways from the contemporary advanced country conglomerates.  
 
The important point is that in India, as in many other NICs, the large firms dominate the 
economy. In the following empirical analysis, we concentrate on the hundred largest Indian 
manufacturing corporations quoted on the stock markets during the period 1980-1990. As a 
rough indication of their significance, in 1990, the aggregate sales of these hundred largest 
corporations accounted for 43% of the total manufacturing value added in the economy as a 
whole. To the extent that sales are being compared with the value added, this figure overstates 
the degree of aggregate concentration in the economy. However, it is also understated in a 
significant way since some industrial groups have more than one corporation listed on the stock 
market. In the following analysis, if such corporations belonged to the top hundred, they would 
be treated as separate independent entities (rather than as part of the single industrial group). 
 
II.2 Capital Structures and the Financing of Corporate Growth 
 
                                                                
and Pfeffermann (1983). 
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Using the IFC data bank
4
 on corporate finance in industrialising economies, tables 1 to 4 report 
on the main economic and financial characteristics of these hundred largest manufacturing 
corporations for the decade 1980-1990. For each corporation the following four groups of 
variables were calculated on the basis of accounting and stock market information available in 
the IFC data bank: 
A. Firm size (indicated either by 'Net-Assets' or Sales) and Measures of Corporate Performance 
(Pre and Post-Tax Profitability and Growth). 
B. Financing of corporate growth: Retention Ratio and Internal (Retained Profits) and External 
Financing (Debt or Equity) of growth. 
C. Corporate Capital Structures: Stock and Flow measures of Gearing. 
D. Stock market valuation and Dividend Return. 
 
The tables present quartile distributions of a small selection of variables from each of the four 
groups above. In order to reduce the influence of stochastic short-term fluctuations, only 
long-term values of these variables, averaged over the whole period 1980-1990, are reported in 
the tables. In table 1, firm size (see column 1) is measured by the value, in local currency, of the 
firm's net-assets, i.e. total assets minus current liabilities. The table shows, as one would expect, 
a highly skewed size distribution of firms. Although the sample consists of the largest listed 
corporations, the range of variation in the top hundred is still enormous. The biggest corporation 
in the sample is more than one hundred times as large as the smallest. 
 
Corporate growth is measured in table 1 either by the rate of growth of net assets or sales, 
normally over the period 1980-1990. Column 3 indicates that the median corporation recorded a 
growth in sales of 16% per annum during the last decade. As the average rate of inflation during 
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 6 
the decade was about 8% per annum, the average growth rate of the top Indian manufacturing 
corporations,even in real terms, at 8% per annum, was quite fast. However, corporate growth 
rates display wide dispersion, with the highest growth rate being almost eight times the value of 
the first quartile. The post-tax rate of return on net worth for the median Indian corporation 
during the 1980s averaged 16% per annum. Although the inter-firm dispersion in post-tax 
profitability is not as large as that in the growth of corporate sales, or net assets, it is still 
considerable. The last column provides information on the time variability of the rates of return 
for the sample corporations during the 1980s.  
 
Table 2 presents data on the financing of corporate growth. The average large Indian firm 
retained about two-thirds of its after-tax profits in the business and distributed the rest. The 
'mean' corporation financed the growth of its net assets between 1980 and 1990 in the following 
proportions: a little over 40% from internal sources, i.e. retained profits; a little over 20% from 
the issues of new equity shares and about 40% from long-term debt and other long-term 
liabilities. Although the proportions are much the same for median corporation, the accounting 
identity, that the internal and external financing of growth should add up to a hundred (i.e. total 
growth), holds only for the (arithmetic) mean corporation.  
 
Table 3 provides information on the capital structures of the top Indian corporations. The first 
two columns give stock measures of gearing (the long-term debt to net-assets ratio and 
debt-equity ratio); the last two columns present alternative flow measures - interest as a 
proportion of earnings before interest and taxation, and interest as a proportion of total cash 
flow. The table shows the median debt-equity ratio to be little over half, but there is again a 
wide range. The interest payments of the average top Indian corporation in the 1980s amounted 
to almost half of its total cash flow.  
 
Table 4 reports on stock market performance (measured either by Marris's (1964) valuation ratio 
  
 
 7 
(stock market value of the firm's equity / book value of its assets) or the price earnings ratio) of 
the top corporations. The last column gives dividends as a proportion of the book value of net 
assets. During the 1980s, the average price-earnings ratio of these corporations was about 10, 
but with a range of 1 to 52. Similarly it would appear from col.1 that in more than a quarter of 
the corporations, the stock market value of the firm was considerably below the book value of 
their assets. Column 3 shows that the average dividend return was about 5% in the 1980s.  
 
Table 5 presents time series for a selection of variables for the Indian corporations. This is 
simply another way of organising the basic panel data information contained in the IFC data 
bank. The data in this table complements the cross-section results presented in tables 1 to 4. 
Table 5 indicates generally falling rates of return for the Indian corporations in the second half 
of the decade. Similarly it would appear that the large Indian corporations issued more debt as 
the decade progressed - the debt to net asset ratios in the second half of the 1980s are markedly 
greater than those in the first half. The last column of the table brings out the remarkable 
stability of the average dividend return between 1982 and 1991. 
 
III. Financing of Large Corporations and Corporate Capital Structures in India and In 
Asian NICs - A Comparison 
 
How do the financial characteristics of the large Indian corporations compare with those of their 
counterparts in other NICs? Some important features of the comparative corporate financial 
structures in developing countries emerge from a simple visual examination of the univariate 
distributions of the few of the main variables. Graphs 1 and 2 portray such distributions for 
three countries, India, Korea and Malaysia
5
 for a small number of variables. Broadly speaking, 
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 8 
the graphs indicate similar shapes of distributions although the scales of the variables are 
different between countries. The graphs also suggest reasonably well behaved distributions of 
corporate characteristics for the Asian corporations
6
. Moreover, these distributions exhibit much 
the same kinds of regularities as you find in the corresponding data for advanced countries. On 
the face of it, this is surprising since the economic environment in which the developing country 
corporations operate varies greatly between the developing countries themselves, let alone 
between the developed and developing countries. The economic explanation for this 
phenomenon must lie in the operation of market forces which despite the huge inter-country 
differences in tax-structures, the political nature of the regimes, government policies, etc. 
manage to impose a certain order on the behaviour of these corporate entities.  
 
Instead of displaying the entire distributions, table 6 provides in a summary form an 
international comparison of the relevant corporate characteristics in five Asian countries: India, 
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand and Pakistan
7
. This table reports only median values of the main 
variables (which are the focus of attention in this paper) for each country.  
 
Table 6 shows that the Indian corporations typically retained a marginally greater proportion of 
their profits than the corresponding firms in Korea and Pakistan. However, the average Indian 
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 9 
retention ratio during the 1980s was considerably larger than that in Thailand and Malaysia. 
More significantly, col.2 indicates that the top Indian and Pakistani corporations financed their 
long-term growth of net assets from internal sources i.e. retained profits, to a far greater degree 
than their counterparts in Korea and Thailand. Equally important, the Korean and Malaysian 
corporations financed nearly half of their growth from new equity issues on the stock markets, 
whilst the corresponding figure for the median Indian corporation, at 16.3%, was very much  
lower. Indian companies, however, used relatively more long term debt to finance their growth 
than their Korean and Malaysian counterparts. The last column suggests that among the sample 
Asian NICs, the Thai corporations have the highest debt to net assets ratio, followed by Korea 
and India. The corresponding ratios in Pakistan and Malaysia were much smaller.  
 
IV. Corporate Financing Patterns In India and In Industrial Countries 
 
We have seen in the last section that there are important differences in corporate financing 
patterns among the Asian NICs. Nevertheless it is important to note that these differences are 
not as pronounced as those between the corporations in the NICs and their advanced country 
counterparts. Thus for example, although the Indian companies compared with say the Korean 
corporations, finance a much smaller proportion of their long term growth from (a) external 
sources and (b) new equity on the stock market, these proportions are nevertheless much larger 
than those typically observed for US and UK corporations. Mayer's (1990) data shows that the 
typical Anglo-Saxon corporation during the period 1970 to 1985 financed almost whole of its 
investment from internal sources
8
. The stock market, on Mayer's figures made a net negative 
contribution to the financing of corporate growth during this period in these countries. (The 
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negative contribution arises from the fact that the value of new issues in the stock market was 
lower than the shares which were redeemed or retained as a consequence of takeovers). Mayer 
found that even in the non Anglo-Saxon industrial countries like Germany and Japan, the stock 
market's contribution to total sources of corporate finance was very small - barely 2 to 3 per 
cent.  
 
In comparison with these industrial country figures, the Indian companies, as indeed, those of 
other Asian NICs, would appear to use both (i) external finance and (ii) equity finance to a far 
greater degree. The relatively much greater use of both (i) and (ii) by developing country 
corporations is extremely surprising. It is both counter-intuitive and goes against the predictions 
of economic theory. In view of the low level of development of the LDC capital markets and 
their much greater imperfections, one would have expected developing country corporations to 
rely more on internal finance. A priori, one would also expect them to resort far less to the 
stockmarket to raise finance than, for example, firms in industrial countries with well developed 
capital markets. 
 
More specifically, following Singh (1994, 1995), the implications of the relevant theoretical 
models for the developing country stock markets and financing of corporate growth in these 
countries may be summarised as follows. First, because these countries do not as yet have the 
accounting standards, or possess in sufficient numbers information-gathering and disseminating 
private firms or public organisations of the kind found in developed countries, the share prices 
in these emerging markets are likely to be dominated by 'noise' and speculation. Second, the fact 
that not many listed companies in these young markets will have a long enough track record, or 
sufficient time to establish reputations, will tend to produce market volatility and arbitrary 
prices. Third, apart from reducing the efficiency of the pricing signals emanating from the 
market, such volatility and arbitrary pricing will also discourage firms from seeking a stock 
market listing or attempting to raise funds by new issues. Other inter-related market 
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imperfections such as asymmetric information which, a priori, will be greater in emerging 
markets than in the mature ones, will also act in the same direction. 
  
The world clearly does not correspond to the predictions of these theoretical models. As noted 
earlier, the Indian stock market is the second largest in the world in terms of the number of 
companies listed on the stock market, just a short distance behind the US. There were many 
more companies listed on the Indian stockmarkets than on those of advanced country markets 
such as the UK, Germany or Italy.   
 
V. Stock market development in the Asian economies 
 
Tables 7 and 8 provide quantitative indicators for stockmarket development in Asian NICs in 
the 1980s. Although India is a clear outlier in terms of the numbers of listed companies, the data 
in the two tables show the fast growth of these markets during this period in most countries in 
various dimensions (the number of listings, market capitalization as a proportion of GDP, value 
traded as a proportion of market capitalization or of GDP).  
 
How are these anomalous phenomena of heavy reliance on new share issues and the fast 
development of stockmarkets in the industrialising economies in the recent period to be 
explained?
9
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Singh (1994, 1995) has argued that unlike the situation in the past in the advanced countries like 
the UK or the US during the course of their industrialisation, stock market development in the 
contemporary industrialising countries is not a spontaneous or an evolutionary response to 
market forces. Rather for various reasons, the developing country governments have played a 
major role in the expansion and development of these markets. 
 
The motivation for this prominent role of the government has come from a variety of sources, 
some of which are country specific.  However there are certain important, often interrelated, 
common factors which have influenced governmental concerns and actions in this area in a 
wide range of countries.  First, the privatization programmes in many countries has been an 
important stimulus to stock market development.(Pfeffermann,1988). Secondly, in the wake of 
the debt crisis, developing country governments have been urged to foster stockmarket 
development to attract non-debt-creating foreign portfolio investment
10
. Thirdly, related to the 
first point, another macroeconomic factor which has motivated several countries has been the 
desire to tap private savings to finance industrial enterprises which have not been privatised and 
are still under state ownership.  For example, the governments in countries like Korea and 
Malaysia have sold small proportions of equity in the existing public sector enterprises on the 
stock markets to raise funds for investment.  
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introduction of mutual funds". (Parenthesis added; pp.1106-7). 
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Fourthly, there has been a world wide trend towards deregulation and globalization of stock 
markets which started in the advanced countries in the mid-1970s
11
.  Many developing 
countries have responded to these developments, as well as to pressures from advanced 
countries to open up their financial markets, by first taking steps to encourage and to strengthen 
these markets and then to liberalize them in stages. Fifthly, international financial institutions 
have also favoured stockmarket development in the LDCs. This is in part because of the failings 
of the so-called development finance institutions (DFIs) which hitherto have been the main 
providers of finance for long-term industrial development in many countries. (World Bank, 
1989).    
 
The measures to stimulate stock market development in industrialising economies during the 
1980s have not been confined to the removal of restrictions on market activities. Rather, the 
governments have pursued a number of policies to actively promote these markets. In Korea the 
government has attempted to educate the general public in stock ownership through a 
country-wide drive. [Amsden and Euh, 1990].  In India, the non-resident persons of Indian 
origin (the so-called NRIs), have been given special incentives to invest their foreign money on 
the stock market. With respect to the fast expansion of the Indian capital markets during the 
1980s, Kar(1989) notes: "An important conclusion that emerges is that much of the capital 
market growth has been policy induced and has yet to be fully reciprocated by the corporate 
performance".(page 24, emphasis added).  
 
With the liberalisation of the Indian economy since 1991, the government has provided a 
number of additional fiscal and other incentives to foster stock market development. The result 
has been an explosive growth of the market. Notwithstanding the stock market scam of 1992, 
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the total market capitalization on the Indian stockmarkets reached Rs. 250,000 crores in 
1992-93 which amounted to 40 percent of GNP (compared with 5 percent in 1980-81 and 13% 
in 1990). Similarly, the number of shareholders and investors in mutual funds rose to 30 million 
by 1992-93 compared with only 2 million in 1981. [Mayya, 1993]. 
 
Apart from this government-induced growth of stock markets in many developing countries in 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, Singh (1995) has argued that an essential reason why the 
developing country corporations have been going to the stockmarket so much during this period 
to raise new equity issues is because the relative cost of equity capital has fallen significantly as 
a result of large rises in share prices. This,together with the increase in the cost of debt capital, 
made equity issues relatively more attractive for financing corporate growth
12
. 
 
In addition to the above, Singh's explanation for the observed general heavy reliance on the 
stockmarket by large Asian firms and for the fast growth of these markets in the 1980s and into 
the 1990s, contains the following elements: 
 
(a). The supply curve of securities in these countries would appear to be reasonably elastic. In 
some countries this was the result of deliberate policy measures. 
(b). There were domestic and international factors involved which helped raise share prices and 
the P/E ratios in this period. 
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of inflation in the 1980s, the real interest rates in India fell 
in the 1980s, compared with the period 1975-79.[See further Singh 
(1994), tables H5 and H6]. 
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VI. Stock market and Industrial Development 
 
How does the development of stock markets, bank and other financial institutions, affect 
industrial development and economic growth? Following the earlier historical contributions of 
Goldsmith, (1969), Cameron (1976) and Gerschenkron (1962), and the theoretical work of 
Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), there has been in recent years a large and a growing amount 
of research on this subject.  
 
One strand of literature, which draws its inspiration from the  endogenous growth models of 
Roemer (1988) and Lucas (1988) argues that financial intermediation, as well as the 
stockmarket, helps economic growth by (a) increasing the rate of investment and (b) improving 
the productivity of investments
13
. The markets and the intermediaries carry out the functions of 
screening and monitoring investment projects, which individual investors on their own will find 
too uneconomic to undertake. These intermediary and market functions help diversify systemic 
risk and enable individuals to participate in investment projects which otherwise they may not 
have been willing to do. Thus the economy experiences a higher rate of investment than would 
otherwise have been the case.  Further, to the extent that the financial intermediaries (eg. 
Banks) directly, and the financial markets (through for example the take-over mechanism) are 
actually successful in carrying out these monitoring and screening tasks, this should lead to an 
increase in the marginal efficiency of investment.   
 
In this paradigm the effect of the growth of financial intermediaries and financial markets on 
private household savings is ambiguous.   This is because as Pagano (1993a) notes one effect 
of financial intermediation is more efficient risk sharing, which depending on  the individual's 
utility function can have a negative effect on his or her savings.  Adje and Jovanovic (1993) 
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provide a model in which financial markets have a greater stimulating effect on economic 
growth than financial intermediation.  This is because it is assumed that stockmarkets are more 
conducive to the development of venture capital and hence technical progress than the banks.  
Their cross-country empirical analysis suggests that countries that finance their investments 
more with equities and less with debt tend to grow faster - by a large margin, as much as 2.5% 
per year.  This leads them to enquire why "more countries are not developing their 
stockmarkets as quickly as they can as a means of speeding up their economic development". 
 
This positive analysis of the effect of stockmarkets on economic growth stands in sharp contrast 
to the contribution of another very important school of thought (referred to in the Introduction), 
which stresses the negative impact of these markets on the rate of investment, the time horizon 
of firms, on international competitiveness, and on economic development. It is ironic, that this 
School is increasingly influential in the US and the UK, countries with the most developed 
stockmarkets and where such markets play a critical role in the economy.  The basic thesis of 
this school is that even with well organised and complex stockmarkets such as those found in 
the Anglo Saxon countries, the market does not in practice perform at all well its monitoring, 
screening and disciplinary functions.  
 
The ability of the stockmarket to carry out these tasks depends crucially on the efficiency of two 
mechanisms: (a)the pricing process; and (b)the takeover mechanism.(Singh 1992b). There is a 
growing amount of theoretical as well as empirical work which suggests that the real world 
share prices, although they may be reasonably efficient in Tobin's (1984) 'information arbitrage' 
sense (ie. any new information about a stock or the market in general percolates quickly and 
speedily to all players), do not reflect fundamental values. Research by this school suggests that 
the actual share prices generated even by the fully developed stock markets of London and New 
York are often dominated by speculators, the so called 'noise-traders', by whims and fads, and 
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are therefore not efficient in Tobin's 'fundamental valuation' sense.
14
 There is also evidence that, 
as Keynes had suggested, investors give disproportionate attention to near-term events and 
therefore do not have long time horizons.(Miles,1993). 
 
This 'short-termism' arising from the pricing mechanism is compounded by the failings of the 
take-over process. Empirical studies suggest that selection in the market for corporate control 
does not take place simply on the basis of efficiency (as measured for example by rates of return 
or by stockmarket valuation) but also very importantly on the basis of size.
15
 Thus a large 
relatively unprofitable corporation has, other things being equal, a much smaller chance of being 
taken over than a small, relatively much more profitable firm. A large firm can make itself 
further immune from take-overs by becoming bigger still through the process of take-over 
itself.(Greer,1979). Apart from this perverse outcome for the take-over disciplinary mechanism, 
there are both analytical arguments and empirical evidence which suggests that take-overs 
themselves contribute significantly to market myopia.
16
 
 
The economists of the critical school further argue that these failures in the pricing and 
take-over mechanisms and the consequent short-termism, puts the stockmarket dominated US 
and UK economies at a competitive disadvantage with respect to countries like Japan and 
Germany. In the latter two countries, the stockmarkets, for historical reasons, have not been so 
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significant in relation to industrial development. It is also notable that neither Japan nor 
Germany  have a market for corporate control in the Anglo-Saxon sense of hostile take-overs, 
leveraged buy-outs, etc.
17
 
 
To sum up, the above analysis suggests that even with well organised and complex stock 
markets, such as those existing in the US and the UK, the stock market is unable to perform 
well its disciplinary and allocative tasks. Nor, as the evidence provided in Section V on the 
financing of corporate growth in industrial countries suggests, is the stock market conspicuously 
successful in providing new resources for corporate growth. To the extent that in developing 
countries, the pricing process is likely to be more volatile and less efficient than in the industrial 
countries, the analysis of the critical school suggests that the monitoring, screening and 
disciplining functions of the stock markets are likely to be better and more efficiently performed 
by financial intermediaries, i.e., the banks.
18
 
 
The exponents of the stock market can, however, still point out to two important ways in which 
in the present context of developing countries, the stock market may be expected to help 
industrial and economic developments. Firstly , as seen earlier, unlike the case of the industrial 
country corporations, the corporations in India, as in other Asian NICs, do finance a 
considerable proportion of their growth by new issues on the stockmarket
19
. Secondly, there is 
                     
    
17
See further Mullins and Wadhwani (1989); Odagiri and Hess 
(1989).   
    
18
Tirole (1991) makes this argument most persuasively in 
relation to the transition economies of Eastern Europe. 
    
19
It is important to note that in the India case, this is very 
much a phenomena of the 1980s. As Balasubramanian (1993) notes, 
"Compared to the roughly Rs. 100 crores figure around which capital 
issues of equity and debt securities were hovering until the 
sixties, the numbers began to climb upwards in the following decade. 
In many ways, 1980 could be described as the take-off year for 
capital issues: for the first time, capital raised in that year 
crossed the Rs. 200 crore mark. Since then, capital issues market 
has come a long way, with the figures for 1988-89 and 1989-90 
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the important issue of foreign portfolio investment which a developing country with a well 
organised stock market may be able to attract. 
 
Singh (1993) has carefully considered these arguments and found them not fully convincing. On 
the first question of the provision of additional resources, although it is true that in the stock 
market boom of the 1980s and the 1990s, the market has been a genuine source of finance for 
corporate expansion in India and in other Asian NICs, the important question is whether the fast 
growth of the stock markets in these economies has led to an increase in aggregate savings. Or 
is it the case that what has happened is simply the substitution of one form of saving (say bank 
savings or government bonds)for another (purchase of corporate shares on the stock market). 
These issues have not been systematically investigated for most LDCs. Nagaraj (1996), 
however, provides some useful evidence for India.  This shows that financial liberalisation and 
capital market growth in the 1980s in that country led to portfolio substitution from bank 
deposits to tradeable securities rather than greater aggregate national or financial savings. 
 
Nagaraj notes that despite the stockmarket boom of that decade and the substantial resources 
raised there by Indian corporations, corporate investment in fixed assets declined.  Nor does he 
find evidence of increased output growth in the private corporate sector.  The sector apparently 
used the new stockmarket funds to alter the corporate capital structure by increasing the 
proportions of equity capital and substituting securitised debt for bank loans.  Both Singh 
(1995) and Nagaraj report a secular fall in corporate profitability in India during the 1980s, 
which could in principle be due to product market liberalization.   However, it then becomes 
difficult to explain the stockmarket boom except in terms of market psychology and 
speculation. 
 
                                                                
crossing Rs. 3000 crores and Rs. 6000 crores respectively. 
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Turning to foreign portfolio investment, it is again very much the case that because of the 
generally low observed correlations between the emerging and the industrial country stock 
markets, portfolio investment in emerging stock markets has become attractive for pension 
funds and other institutional investors in advanced countries seeking diversification and risk 
spreading. Such investment has evidently been important in raising PE ratios and hence 
reducing the cost of capital to the Indian and other LDC corporations in the recent period. 
However, such capital inflows can be quite volatile and cause serious problems for 
macro-economic management of the economy. As Akyuz (1993) points out external 
liberalisation through opening stockmarkets to non-residents leads to close links between two 
inherently unstable markets even when the capital account is not fully open - the stock and 
currency markets.  Faced with an economic shock the two markets may interact with each other 
in a negative feed-back loop to produce even greater instability for the markets and the whole 
financial system.  Moreover, the gyrations in these markets may discourage aggregate 
investment through various channels, e.g. depressing business expectations because of greater 
uncertainty; greater instability in aggregate consumption because of wealth effects caused by 
large fluctuations in stockmarket prices.  These factors contribute to the instability of the real 
economy and may also reduce long-term economic growth. The Mexican debacle of December 
1994 has painfully brought home the difficulties caused by volatile portfolio capital flows. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that the fast growth of stockmarkets in India in the 1980s and into the 
1990s is not an isolated phenomenon.  Similar developments have occurred in other 
industrialising economies.  These are a part of a worldwide trend towards deregulation of 
financial markets and the greater role of the market forces in the allocation of resources.  
However, it has also been suggested here that this stockmarket development is not a 
spontaneous or evolutionary response to market forces, but instead has generally been policy 
  
 
 21 
induced. 
 
Nevertheless, the liberalisation of the financial sector and the vast expansion of stockmarkets in 
India and other industrialising economies in the 1980s and 1990s has had a major impact on 
corporate finance.  The new issues on the stockmarket, whether of ordinary shares or of 
debentures, have during this period made a significant contribution to corporate growth in the 
semi-industrial countries.  However the important issue is whether this greater reliance on the 
stockmarket by large firms has led to, or will in future promote faster industrialisation and 
long-term dynamic efficiency (in the sense of raising the trend rate of growth of productivity). 
Specifically will it increase the overall rates of savings and investment in the economy, or raise 
the productivity of investments by more efficient allocation of investment resources.   
 
There is no evidence to suggest that either of these positive developments have actually 
occurred in India or in the other NICS.  The experience of the advanced countries with well 
organised stockmarkets and wide share ownership does not provide any great hope in these 
respects for the future either.  On the contrary, notwithstanding the supposed theoretical 
advantages of stockmarkets, the actual workings of the pricing and the takeover mechanisms in 
the stockmarket dominated economies of the US and the UK suggest that these countries may 
be put at a competitive disadvantage in comparison with Japan and Germany, where 
traditionally the banks rather than the stockmarket have played the key role in industrial 
development. 
 
However, despite the dubious merits of stockmarkets for industrialisation and for the promotion 
of dynamic efficiency, it is today politically unrealistic to expect that stockmarkets in India or in 
other NICS can either be abolished or significantly rolled back.  The policy question then is 
how to minimise the harmful effects of these markets (speculation, price volatility, 
short-termism) for industrial development.  Singh (1993,1994) has argued that inter alia one 
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important step which industrialising economies should take at this juncture is to nip in the bud 
the development of a market for corporate control. As noted in section VI, there are strong 
analytical reasons as well as evidence to suggest that such a market, instead of being beneficial, 
greatly increases the likelihood and the  significance of the negative consequences of 
stockmarkets referred to above.   
 
Up to now takeover bids and mergers have played a relatively small role in the expansion of 
large firms in India as well as in other NICs:  most of corporate growth has been organic and 
based on new investment.  However, the very existence of huge conglomerates in developing 
countries - which must be regarded as potentially predatory - means that the further evolution of 
the stockmarkets and greater institutional share ownership is bound to lead to the development 
of a market for corporate control.  Countries like India need to undertake strong purposeful 
measures to stop such institutional changes which are likely to harm the growth of smaller 
firms, reduce competitiveness and dynamic efficiency. This kind of preventive action is likely to 
be far more useful than subsequent regulation of a full blown market for corporate control. 
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